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Abstract 
We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness 
on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are 
satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of GK there is 
a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network 
in GK. Third, there is no proper subset of GK satisfying the first two conditions. 
We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for 
the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. There is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1 
consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement 
of G1 for generic allocation rules. We then provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K 
farsightedly stable and we consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency 
of networks. We show the tractability of the concept by applying it to a model of criminal networks. 
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1 Introduction
Networks of relationships help determine the careers that people choose, the jobs
they obtain, the products they buy, and how they vote. The many aspects of our
lives that are governed by social networks make it critical to understand how they
impact behavior and which network structures are likely to emerge in a society. A
simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine the requirement that individuals do not benefit from altering the
structure of the network.
A prominent example of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion defined
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).1 A network is pairwise stable if no individual
benefits from deleting a link and no two individuals benefit from adding a link
between them, with at least one benefitting strictly. While pairwise stability is
natural, easy to work with and a very important tool in network analysis,2 it assumes
that individuals are myopic, and not farsighted, in the sense that they do not forecast
how others might react to their actions. Indeed, the addition or deletion of one
link might lead to subsequent additions or deletions of other links. For instance,
individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current
network, as this might induce the formation of other links, ultimately leading to
lower payoffs for them.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) introduce the notion of pairwise
farsighted stability. A set of networks is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible
farsighted pairwise deviations from any network within the set to a network outside
the set are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there
exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some
network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset satisfying conditions (i) and
(ii).3 Pairwise farsighted stability makes sense if players have perfect anticipation
1An alternative way to model network stability is to explicitly model a game by which links form
and then to solve that game using the concept of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements. See
Aumann and Myerson (1988), Myerson (1991) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) among others.
2Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) find that pairwise stability leads to testable predictions for the
network architectures generated by labor-sharing groups in village economies of rural Ethiopia. In
addition, their empirical results confirm strongly that the architecture of a social network and not
just the number of links, has an important role to play in understanding network formation, and
the role of social networks on economic performance.
3Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Chwe
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of how others might react to changes in the network. But in general, especially
when the set of players becomes large, it requires too much foresight on behalf of
the players.4
Our aim is to provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence
of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. We define the notion of a level-
K farsightedly stable set. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable
set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred.
That is, adding a link ij to a network g ∈ GK that leads to a network outside of
GK , is deterred by the threat of ending in g
′. Here g′ is such that either there is a
farsighted improving path of length smaller than or equal to K − 2 from g + ij to
g′ and g′ belongs to GK or there is a farsighted improving path of length equal to
K−1 from g+ ij to g′ and there is no farsighted improving path from g+ ij to g′ of
smaller length. A similar requirement is imposed for the case where a link is severed.
Second, external stability is required or, in other words, the networks within the set
should be robust to perturbations. That is, from any network outside of GK there
is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K
leading to some network in GK . Third, a minimality condition is required. That is,
there is no proper subset of GK satisfying the first two conditions.
We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide
a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. We
find that there is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1. It is given by the
set consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles, so it includes all pairwise
stable networks. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of myopic stability
for generic allocation rules: for any K ≥ 1, the myopically stable set G1 contains
a level-K farsightedly stable set GK . Thus, an analysis based on myopic behavior
may not rule out some networks that are not stable when players are sufficiently
farsighted. At the same time, a myopic analysis is compatible with farsightedness,
and for any value of K there is always a level-K farsightedly stable set that consists
(1994), Xue (1998), Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2004), Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2005), Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005), Page and Wooders
(2009), Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011), and Ray and Vohra (2013).
4Kirchsteiger, Mantovani, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2013) design a simple network formation
experiment to test between pairwise stability and farsighted stability, but find evidence against both
of them. Their experimental evidence suggests that subjects are consistent with an intermediate
rule of behavior, which can be interpreted as a form of limited farsightedness.
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exclusively of networks that belong to closed cycles. But, some networks that are
not part of any closed cycle may constitute a level-K farsightedly stable set when
K strictly exceeds one.
We provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable.
We also consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency
of networks. We show that if there is a network that Pareto dominates all other
networks, then that network is the unique prediction of level-K farsighted stability
if K is greater than the maximum number of links in a network. In addition, we
introduce a property on the allocation rule under which level-K farsighted stability
singles out the complete network. Finally, we illustrate the tractability of our new
concept by analyzing the criminal network model of Calvo-Armengol and Zenou
(2004). We find that in criminal networks with n players, the set consisting of the
complete network, so all criminals are linked to each other, is the unique level-(n−1)
farsightedly stable set.
Recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that players’s initial choices in
games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, that structural non-equilibrium
level-k (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta,
2001) or cognitive hierarchy (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) models often out-
predict equilibrium,5 and that players only look a finite number of steps ahead
when making choices.6 We assume that players are limited farsighted, but we do not
require that players choose best responses to some beliefs on opponents’ strategies.
In our concept, players cannot even think about a strategy since they are not able
to reason about what takes place after a certain reasoning horizon.
Recently, Morbitzer, Buskens and Rosenkranz (2011) develop a model of network
formation where players look a finite number of steps ahead when anticipating the
reaction of other players to their change. The decision to initiate a change to the
5Level-k theory and the closely related cognitive hierarchy theory distinguish types of players
according to the level at which they reason. Assumptions about level-0 behavior provide an anchor
for beliefs and strategies at higher levels. At each higher level, players are assumed to know the
probability distributions of strategies at lower levels. Level-1 players choose best responses to
level-0 choices, while level-2 players choose best responses to level-1 choices (level-k theory) or to
some probability distribution over level-0 and level-1 strategies (cognitive hierarchy theory). See
Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2013) for a review of the literature.
6Players who are motivated by substantial incentives often violate backward induction even in
simple sequential games such as the centipede game. See McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) among
others.
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network is based on some ad hoc rules that weigh improving paths that might
follow their change, but which are not necessarily improving paths for the players
who made the initial change. Using computer simulations they show that, in the
co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), limited farsighted players can
overcome the tension between stability and efficiency only if the number of players
is small. Their concept is a refinement of the set of pairwise stable networks and
may therefore fail to exist.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and
basic properties and definitions for networks. In Section 3 we define the notions of
improving paths and level-K pairwise stability and we show that level-K pairwise
stable networks may fail to exist. In Section 4 we define the notion of a level-K
farsightedly stable set and we characterize it. In Section 5 we study the relationship
to pairwise stability. In Section 6 we provide easy to verify sufficient conditions for
a set to be level-K farsightedly stable. We look at the relationship between level-
K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks in Section 7. In that section we
also show that under increasing returns to link creation, level-K farsighted stability
singles out the complete network. In Section 8 we analyze the Calvo-Armengol and
Zenou (2004) model of criminal networks using level-K farsighted stability. Finally,
in Section 9 we conclude.
2 Networks
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of players who are involved in some network rela-
tionship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled
as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate
bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of
which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij ∈ g to indicate that
i and j are linked under the network g. The complete network on the set of players
S ⊆ N is denoted gS and is equal to the set of all subsets of S of size 2.7 It follows in
particular that the empty network is denoted by g∅. The set of all possible networks
or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN . The cardinality
of G is denoted by n′ = 2n(n−1)/2.
7Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and  for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
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The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted by
g+ ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g
by g − ij. Let
g|S = {ij ∈ g | i, j ∈ S}.
Thus, g|S is the network found by deleting all links except those that are between
players in S. For any network g, let N(g) = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g} be
the set of players who have at least one link in the network g.
A path in a network g ∈ G between players i and j of length K ≥ 1 is a
finite sequence of players i0, . . . , iK with i0 = i and iK = j such that for any
k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, ikik+1 ∈ g, and such that each player in the sequence i0, . . . , iK
is distinct. A network g is connected if for each pair of players i and j in N(g) such
that i 6= j there exists a path between i and j in g. This definition implies that the
empty network g∅ is connected. A non-empty network h ⊆ g is a component of g
if for all i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(h) \ {i}, there exists a path in h connecting i and j,
and for any i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ h. The set of components
of g is denoted by C(g). Using the components of a network, we can partition the
players into maximal groups within which players are connected. Let P (g) denote
the partition of N induced by the network g. That is, the set of player S belongs
to P (g) if and only if either there exists a network h in C(g) such that S = N(h)
or there exists i /∈ N(g) such that S = {i}.
An allocation rule is a function Y : G → RN which gives for every player i and
network g a payoff Yi(g).
3 Improving Paths
A farsighted improving path of length K ≥ 0 from a network g to a network g′ 6= g
is a finite sequence of networks g0, . . . , gK with g0 = g and gK = g
′ such that for any
k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1} either (i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Yi(gK) > Yi(gk)
or Yj(gK) > Yj(gk), or (ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gK) > Yi(gk) and
Yj(gK) ≥ Yj(gk). Since the set {0, . . . , K − 1} is empty for K = 0, this definition
implies that there is a farsighted improving path of length 0 from each network g to
itself, but clearly there are no farsighted improving paths of length 0 from g to any
other network. If there exists a farsighted improving path of length K from g to g′,
then we write g →K g′.
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For a given network g and some K ′ ≥ 0, let fK′(g) be the set of networks that
can be reached from g by a farsighted improving path of length K ≤ K ′. That is,
fK′(g) = {g′ ∈ G | ∃K ≤ K ′ such that g →K g′}.
This defines fK′ as a correspondence on the set G. The set of networks that can be
reached from g by some farsighted improving path is denoted by f∞(g), so
f∞(g) = {g′ ∈ G | ∃K ∈ N such that g →K g′}.
The following lemma follows almost immediately and is presented without proof.
Lemma 1. For K ≥ 0, for every g ∈ G, it holds that fK(g) ⊆ fK+1(g). For
K ≥ n′ − 1, for every g ∈ G, it holds that fK(g) = fK+1(g) = f∞(g).
For K ≥ 0, we define the relation f˜K on G as f˜K(g) = fK(g) \ {g}, g ∈ G, so
the network g is dropped from fK(g) and the set f˜K(g) corresponds to the networks
different from g that can be reached from g by a farsighted improving path of length
at most K (and at least one). Similarly, we define f˜∞ by f˜∞(g) = f∞(g) \ {g} for
every g ∈ G.
An important concept in the analysis of networks is the one of pairwise stability
as introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Definition 1. A network g ∈ G is pairwise stable if
1. for every ij ∈ g, Yi(g) ≥ Yi(g − ij) and Yj(g) ≥ Yj(g − ij),
2. for every ij /∈ g, if Yi(g) < Yi(g + ij), then Yj(g) > Yj(g + ij).
We say that a network g′ is adjacent to g if g′ = g+ ij or g′ = g− ij for some ij.
A network g′ defeats g if either g′ = g− ij and Yi(g′) > Yi(g) or Yj(g′) > Yj(g), or if
g′ = g+ ij with (Yi(g′), Yj(g′)) > (Yi(g), Yj(g)).8 A network is pairwise stable if and
only if it is not defeated by another network.9 It is also easy to see that g′ ∈ f˜1(g) if
8We use the notation (Yi(g
′), Yj(g′)) > (Yi(g), Yj(g)) for Yi(g′) ≥ Yi(g) and Yj(g′) ≥ Yj(g)
with at least one inequality holding strictly, (Yi(g
′), Yj(g′)) ≥ (Yi(g), Yj(g)) for Yi(g′) ≥ Yi(g) and
Yj(g
′) ≥ Yj(g), and (Yi(g′), Yj(g′)) (Yi(g), Yj(g)) for Yi(g′) > Yi(g) and Yj(g′) > Yj(g).
9Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduce the
notion of strong stability, where stability of the network against deviations by arbitrary coalitions
is required. In the same spirit, our theory of limited farsightedness can easily be modified to study
coalitional moves rather than pairwise moves.
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and only if g′ defeats g. We can therefore characterize the pairwise stable networks
as those g ∈ G for which f˜1(g) = ∅, or, alternatively, f1(g) = {g}. This formulation
readily suggests the following stability notion when players are less myopic.
Definition 2. For K ≥ 1, a network g ∈ G is level-K pairwise stable if fK(g) = {g}.
We may replace the condition fK(g) = {g} for level-K pairwise stability by the
equivalent condition f˜K(g) = ∅.
The set of level-K pairwise stable networks is denoted by PK . The set PK might
be worth studying in its own right. However, similar to the case of myopic players,
there is no guarantee that this set is non-empty. It follows from Lemma 1 that
PK ⊇ PK+1, so emptiness is more likely to become a problem for higher values of
K.10 In the next section we present a stability notion that does not suffer from this
emptiness problem.
The set f 2K(g) = fK(fK(g)) = {g′′ ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ fK(g) such that g′′ ∈ fK(g′)}
consists of those networks that can be reached by a composition of two farsighted
improving paths of length at most K from g. We extend this definition and, for
m ∈ N, we define fmK (g) as those networks that can be reached from g by means
of m compositions of farsighted improving paths of length at most K. Since there
are n′ networks in G, it follows that fmK is the same for all values of m greater than
or equal to n′ − 1. The resulting correspondence for such values of m is called the
transitive closure of fK and is denoted by f
∞
K .
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Lemma 1 extends to compositions of fK and in particular to the transitive closure
f∞K of fK as is shown in the following lemma, which is presented without proof.
Lemma 2. For K ≥ 0, for every g ∈ G, it holds that f∞K (g) ⊆ f∞K+1(g). For
K ≥ n′ − 1, for every g ∈ G, it holds that f∞K (g) = f∞K+1(g) = f∞∞ (g).
Jackson and Watts (2002) have defined the notion of a closed cycle. A set of
networks C is a cycle if for any g′ ∈ C and g ∈ C \ {g′}, there exists a sequence
10Jackson (2008) defines a network to be farsightedly pairwise stable if there is no farsighted
improving path emanating from it. This concept reverts to P∞ and refines the set of pairwise stable
networks. A drawback of the definition is that it does not require that a farsighted improving path
ends at a network that is stable itself. The set P∞ is similar to the farsighted core when only one
link at a time can be deleted or added.
11Page and Wooders (2009) use the path dominance relation to define the notion of path dom-
inance core. For some given m ∈ N, a network g path dominates g′ if g ∈ f˜m∞(g′). The path
dominance core contains all networks that are not path dominated, but it often fails to exist.
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Figure 1: The 3-player investment networks.
of improving paths of length 1 connecting g to g′, i.e. g′ ∈ f∞1 (g). A cycle C is a
maximal cycle if it is not a proper subset of a cycle. A cycle C is a closed cycle if
f∞1 (C) = C, so there is no sequence of improving paths of length 1 starting at some
network in C and leading to a network that is not in C. A closed cycle is necessarily
a maximal cycle. For every network g ∈ P1, the set {g} is a closed cycle. The set of
networks belonging to a closed cycle is non-empty.
We next present an example of an investment game as an example to illustrate
the notion of farsighted improving paths and to point out some of its subtleties.
Example 1. The investment game - myopic analysis. Every player can have a link
with another player at a cost of 1. Every player receives a benefit of n if all players
have formed a link with all other players, but benefits are zero if at least one link
is missing. Let di(g) denote the number of links player i has in g. Then it holds
that Yi(g) = −di(g) if g is not the complete network, and Yi(gN) = n− di(gN) = 1.
Figure 1 presents the resulting payoffs for the case with 3 players.
We compute the farsighted improving paths of lengthK = 1 from a given network
g to find the pairwise stable networks. It can easily be verified that
f1(g) = {g′ ∈ G | g′ ⊆ g, #(g \ g′) ≤ 1}, #g ≤ n(n− 1)/2− 2,
f1(g) = {g′ ∈ G | g′ ⊆ g, #(g \ g′) ≤ 1} ∪ {gN}, #g = n(n− 1)/2− 1,
f1(g
N) = {gN}.
In an investment game with three or more players, it holds that both the empty
network and the complete network are pairwise stable, whereas there are no other
pairwise stable networks.
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Next we consider the transitive closure of f1 to compute the closed cycles in the
investment game. It can easily be computed that
f∞1 (g) = {g′ ∈ G | g′ ⊆ g}, #g ≤ n(n− 1)/2− 2,
f∞1 (g) = {g′ ∈ G | g′ ⊆ g} ∪ {gN}, #g = n(n− 1)/2− 1,
f∞1 (g
N) = {gN}.
The empty network g∅ belongs to f∞1 (g) for every g that is not complete. Now it
is not hard to verify that the closed cycles in the investment example coincide with
the pairwise stable sets, so are given by the empty and the complete network. 
It is a priori reasonable that the complete network is stable. However, this is
less clear for the empty network and the question whether the empty network is
stable or not should be intimately linked to the number of players and their degree
of farsightedness. We continue the example by studying the farsighted improving
paths of length K ≥ 2.
Example 2. The investment game - farsighted analysis. When we consider far-
sighted improving paths of length K = 2 or 3, the complete network belongs to
fK(g) if and only if #(g
N \ g) ≤ K, so the network gN can be obtained from g
by adding K links. When the network g is not complete, fK(g) also includes those
networks that are obtained by deleting less than or equal to K links from g, and no
other networks.
The picture changes slightly when we consider farsighted paths of length 4 or
higher. Although it is generally the case that gN ∈ fK(g) if and only if #(gN \ g) ≤
K, and a subset g′ of g 6= gN belongs to fK(g) if and only if #(g \g′) ≤ K, new pos-
sibilities arise. For instance, in a 4-player investment game it holds that {14, 23} ∈
f4({12, 13, 23, 24}), so the link 14, which did not exist in the starting network
{12, 13, 23, 24}, is added. Indeed, starting from the network g = {12, 13, 23, 24},
first Players 1 and 4 form a link, next Player 1 severs his links with Players 2 and
3, and finally Player 2 cuts his link with Player 4. This constitutes a farsighted
improving path since none of the networks involved in the path is complete, the
degree of Player 1 in the network {12, 13, 23, 24} is one higher than in the network
{14, 23} and the degree of Player 4 is the same, so the addition of the link 14 in
the beginning is feasible. From then on, only links are deleted, which improves the
payoffs of the players involved and does not affect the other players. 
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Despite the subtleties for higher values of K, it is straightforward to verify that
the set PK of level-K pairwise stable sets consists of g
∅ and gN when n(n−1)/2 > K
and is equal to {gN} otherwise. When the level of farsightedness of players is greater
than or equal to n(n − 1)/2, the number of links needed to go from the empty
network to the complete network, the complete network emerges as the unique
level-K pairwise stable set. The level-K pairwise stable set thereby captures the
desired relation between the degree of farsightedness and the instability of the empty
network. In many examples, however, the set PK will be empty and can therefore
not be used to analyze the relation between the degree of farsightedness and stability.
It also suffers from the drawback that the networks to which players plan to deviate
might not be level-K pairwise stable themselves.
4 Level-K Farsighted Stability
To analyze the influence of the degree of farsightedness on the stability of networks,
we define the notion of a level-K farsightedly stable set. In the next definition, we
use the notational convention that f−1(g) = ∅ for every g ∈ G.
Definition 3. For K ≥ 1, a set of networks GK ⊆ G is a level-K farsightedly stable
set with respect to Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ GK,
(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g such that g + ij /∈ GK,
∃g′ ∈ [fK−2(g + ij) ∩GK ] ∪ [fK−1(g + ij) \ fK−2(g + ij)] such that
(Yi(g
′), Yj(g′)) = (Yi(g), Yj(g)) or Yi(g′) < Yi(g) or Yj(g′) < Yj(g),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g − ij /∈ GK,
∃g′, g′′ ∈ [fK−2(g − ij) ∩GK ] ∪ [fK−1(g − ij) \ fK−2(g − ij)] such that
Yi(g
′) ≤ Yi(g) and Yj(g′′) ≤ Yj(g).
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \GK, f∞K (g′) ∩GK 6= ∅.
(iii) ∀G′K  GK, at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by
G′K.
The move from a network g to an adjacent network is called a deviation. Condi-
tion (i) in Definition 3 requires the deterrence of external deviations. Condition (ia)
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captures that adding a link ij to a network g ∈ GK that leads to a network outside
of GK , is deterred by the threat of ending in g
′. Here g′ is such that either there is
a farsighted improving path of length smaller than or equal to K − 2 from g + ij
to g′ and g′ belongs to GK or there is a farsighted improving path of length equal
to K − 1 from g + ij to g′ and there is no farsighted improving path from g + ij to
g′ of smaller length. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case
where a link is severed.12
Since level-K farsightedness models a reasoning horizon of the players of length
K, we have to distinguish farsighted improving paths of length less than or equal to
K − 2 after a deviation from g to g + ij and farsighted improving paths of length
equal to K − 1. In the former case, the reasoning capacity of the players is not yet
reached, and the threat of ending in g′ is only credible if it belongs to the farsightedly
stable set GK . In the latter case, the only way to reach g
′ from g requires K steps
of reasoning or even more; one step in the deviation to g + ij and at least K − 1
additional steps in any farsighted improving path from g + ij to g′. Since this
exhausts the reasoning capacity of the players, the threat of ending in g′ is credible,
irrespective of whether it belongs to GK or not.
Condition (ii) in Definition 3 requires external stability and implies that the
networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside of
GK there is a a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or
equal to K leading to some network in GK .
13 Condition (ii) implies that if a set
of networks is level-K farsightedly stable, it is non-empty. Condition (iii) is the
minimality condition.
Condition (i) in Definition 3 guarantees that networks inside the set GK are
stable for players whose reasoning horizon is of length K. Hence, fK is used for
deterring deviations from networks inside the set GK . Condition (ii) in Definition 3
requires external stability and also implies robustness to perturbations of networks
inside the set GK . Perturbations may be due to exogenous forces acting on the
12Chwe (1994) defines the notion of largest consistent set. A set G is a consistent set if both
external and internal deviations with respect to f˜∞ are deterred. The largest consistent is the set
that contains any consistent set.
13Chwe (1994) defines the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. A set
G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if both external and internal stability
with respect to f˜∞ are satisfied. Page and Wooders (2009) extends this notion by requiring both
external and internal stability with respect to f˜m∞ for given m ∈ N.
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network, or simply errors on the part of some players. When players make linking
decisions at a network outside GK , they move according to some level-K farsighted
improving path without being able to anticipate that other linking decisions might
be taken afterwards. Hence, f∞K is used to capture what could happen at a network
outside GK . Condition (ii) implies that if we allow level-K farsighted players to
successively create or delete links, they will ultimately reach the set GK irrespective
of the initial network.
Condition (ii) immediately implies that a level-K farsightedly stable set of net-
works contains at least one network, so satisfies non-emptiness. The next result
claims existence.
Theorem 1. A level-K farsightedly stable set of networks exists.
Proof. Notice that G trivially satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii). Let us proceed by
contradiction. Assume that there does not exist any set of networks GK ⊆ G
that is level-K farsightedly stable. This means that for any G0K ⊆ G that satisfies
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 3, we can find a proper subset G1K that satisfies
Conditions (i) and (ii). Iterating this reasoning, we can construct an infinite sequence
{GkK}k≥0 of subsets of G satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii) with the property that
GkK ( Gk−1K . But since G has finite cardinality n′, this is not possible.
For the special case where K is equal to 1, we can use the fact that f−1(g) = ∅
and f0(g) = {g}, so Definition 3 simplifies as follows.
Theorem 2. A set of networks G1 ⊆ G is a level-1 farsightedly stable set with
respect to Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G1,
(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g such that g′ = g + ij /∈ G1 it holds that (Yi(g′), Yj(g′)) =
(Yi(g), Yj(g)) or Yi(g
′) < Yi(g) or Yj(g′) < Yj(g),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g′ = g − ij /∈ G1 it holds that Yi(g′) ≤ Yi(g) and
Yj(g
′) ≤ Yj(g).
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \G1, f∞1 (g′) ∩G1 6= ∅.
(iii) ∀G′1  G1, at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by G′1.
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Theorem 2 shows that a level-1 farsightedly stable set is identical to a myopi-
cally stable set as defined in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009). Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown that there is a unique myopically
stable set. It is equal to the set of networks consisting of all networks that belong
to a closed cycle. Theorem 3 below follows.
Theorem 3. There is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set. It is given by the set
consisting of all networks that belong to a closed cycle.
Since a farsightedly stable set cannot be empty, it follows from Theorem 3 that
there is at least one closed cycle. Level-1 farsightedly stable sets are unique. This
result does not carry over to higher levels of K.
Also for K = 2, the definition of a level-K farsightedly stable set simplifies
somewhat, since if a network g+ ij belongs to G \G2 for some set G2, it holds that
f0(g + ij) ∩G2 = {g + ij} ∩G2 = ∅.
Theorem 4. A set of networks G2 ⊆ G is a level-2 farsightedly stable set with
respect to Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G2,
(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g such that g+ij /∈ G2, ∃g′ ∈ f˜1(g+ij) such that (Yi(g′), Yj(g′)) =
(Yi(g), Yj(g)) or Yi(g
′) < Yi(g) or Yj(g′) < Yj(g),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g−ij /∈ G2, ∃g′, g′′ ∈ f˜1(g−ij) such that Yi(g′) ≤ Yi(g)
and Yj(g
′′) ≤ Yj(g).
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \G2, f∞2 (g′) ∩G2 6= ∅.
(iii) ∀G′2  G2, at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by G′2.
Theorem 4 is useful when computing level-2 farsightedly stable sets in examples.
At the other extreme, when K is greater than or equal to n′ + 1, it follows from
Lemma 1 that fK−2(g) = fK−1(g) for every g ∈ G, and from Lemma 2 that f∞K (g) =
f∞n′−1(g) for every g ∈ G. We therefore have the following result.
Theorem 5. For K ≥ n′ + 1, a set of networks GK ⊆ G is a level-K farsightedly
stable set with respect to Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ GK,
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(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g such that g + ij /∈ GK, ∃g′ ∈ fn′−1(g + ij) ∩ GK such that
(Yi(g
′), Yj(g′)) = (Yi(g), Yj(g)) or Yi(g′) < Yi(g) or Yj(g′) < Yj(g),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g − ij /∈ GK, ∃g′, g′′ ∈ fn′−1(g − ij) ∩ GK such that
Yi(g
′) ≤ Yi(g) and Yj(g′′) ≤ Yj(g).
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \GK, f∞n′−1(g′) ∩GK 6= ∅.
(iii) ∀G′K  GK, at least one of the Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) is violated by
G′K.
It follows immediately from Theorem 5 that the collection of K-farsightedly
stable sets is independent of K when K ≥ n′ + 1.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) define a farsightedly stable set as
a set G∞ of networks satisfying Conditions (i) and (iii) of Theorem 5, but with
Condition (ii) replaced by the requirement that
∀g′ ∈ G \G∞, f∞(g′) ∩G∞ 6= ∅,
so the correspondence f∞n′−1 is replaced by f∞ = fn′−1, and one could interpret the
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) concept as level-∞ farsighted stability.
In many applications, the correspondence f∞ is transitive, in which case it coincides
with f∞n′−1, and level-∞ farsighted stable sets are identical to level-(n′ + 1) farsight-
edly stable sets, but in general it only holds that f∞(g) = fn′−1(g) ⊆ f∞n′−1(g) for
g ∈ G. We can therefore conclude that for every level-∞ farsightedly stable set G∞
there is a set G′ ⊆ G∞ such that G′ is level-(n′ + 1) farsightedly stable.
Example 3. Investment game - farsightedly stable sets. We now analyze the con-
cept of a level-K farsightedly stable set for the investment game of Example 1. For
level-1 farsightedly stable sets, we can use Theorem 3 and have to identify all the
closed cycles. Using the analysis in Example 1, we find that the unique farsightedly
stable set consists of the empty and the complete network whenever there are at
least three players.
We will argue next that with n ≥ 3 players, a reasoning horizon of length K equal
to n(n−1)/2 or higher is needed to obtain the complete network as the unique level-
K farsightedly stable set. For K < n(n − 1)/2, we show that the unique level-K
farsightedly stable set consists of the empty and the complete network.
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We argue first that {gN} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set when
K ≥ n(n − 1)/2 ≥ 3. The analysis in Example 1 reveals that gN ∈ f1(g¯) for all
networks g¯ that are adjacent to gN , so by Lemma 1 we have gN ∈ fK−2(g¯) for all
networks g¯ that are adjacent to gN , and Condition (i) of Definition 3 is satisfied
since a deviation from gN to an adjacent network g¯ is deterred by the return to gN .
We have argued in Example 2 that gN ∈ fK(g′) if and only if #(gN \ g′) ≤ K.
It follows that gN ∈ fK(g′) for every g′ 6= gN , since #(gN \ g′) ≤ n(n − 1)/2 ≤
K for every g′ 6= gN . Since fK(g) ⊆ f∞K (g), we have for every g′ ∈ G \ {gN},
f∞K (g
′) ∩ {gN} 6= ∅ and Condition (ii) of Definition 3 is satisfied. Obviously, {gN}
satisfies minimality as expressed in Condition (iii) of Definition 3, so gN is a level-K
farsightedly stable set.
Since Y (gN)  Y (g) for every g ∈ G \ {gN}, it holds that fK(gN) = {gN} for
every value of K ≥ 1, and so f∞K (gN) = {gN}. By Condition (ii) of Definition 3,
it follows that gN ∈ GK for every level-K farsightedly stable set GK . Minimality
as expressed by Condition (iii) of Definition 3 now implies that {gN} is the unique
level-K farsightedly stable set when K ≥ n(n− 1)/2.
Consider next the case K < n(n − 1)/2. It holds that gN /∈ fK(g∅), since one
needs to form n(n − 1)/2 links to go from the empty to the complete network.
Since Y (g∅) ≥ Y (g) for every g ∈ G \ {gN}, it follows that fK(g∅) = {g∅}. By
Condition (ii) of Definition 3, it follows that g∅ ∈ GK for every level-K farsightedly
stable set GK . In the previous paragraph we have argued that g
N ∈ GK . The
analysis in Example 2 reveals that f∞K (g
′)∩{g∅, gN} 6= ∅ for every g′ ∈ G\{g∅, gN}.
Together with Condition (iii) of Definition 3, we now find that {g∅, gN} is the unique
level-K farsightedly stable set when K < n(n− 1)/2. 
5 The Relation to Pairwise Stability
In this section, we discuss how level-K farsightedly stable sets are related to notions
based on pairwise stability such as the set of pairwise stable networks P1, the set of
closed cycles G1, and the set of level-K pairwise stable networks PK .
Theorem 3 implies that any pairwise stable network belongs to G1. The following
theorem shows that this result carries over to higher values of K.
Theorem 6. For K ≥ 1, the set PK of level-K pairwise stable networks is a subset
of any level-K farsightedly stable set GK.
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Proof. Suppose GK is level-K farsightedly stable, but does not contain some g ∈ PK .
By Definition 2, we have fK(g) = {g}. We find that f∞K (g) = {g}, so f∞K (g)∩GK = ∅.
By Condition (ii) of Definition 3, it holds that f∞K (g) ∩GK 6= ∅, a contradiction.
Theorem 6 shows that any network g from which there are no farsighted improv-
ing paths of length smaller than or equal to K to networks different from g belongs
to GK . Level-K pairwise stability is quite demanding for higher levels of K. Since
fK(g) ⊆ fK+1(g), we have that PK ⊇ PK+1.
Theorem 6 yields an easy sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K far-
sightedly stable set as a corollary, where we make use of the minimality requirement
as expressed in Condition (iii) of Definition 3.
Corollary 1. For K ≥ 1, if PK is a level-K farsightedly stable set, then it is
uniquely so.
An allocation rule is said to be generic if for every g, g′ ∈ G such that g and g′
are adjacent it holds that either g ∈ f1(g′) or g′ ∈ f1(g). If an allocation rule is not
generic, then some arbitrarily small perturbation of it will be, and genericity can
therefore be thought of as a weak requirement on allocation rules. The next result
shows that level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of myopic stability for
generic allocation rules.
Theorem 7. Let the allocation rule be generic. For every K ≥ 1, the myopically
stable set G1 contains a level-K farsightedly stable set GK.
Proof. The statement is trivial for K = 1, so we consider K ≥ 2.
We show first that the set G1 satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 3. Consider
some g ∈ G1 and a deviation to g′ ∈ G \G1.
Suppose that g′ ∈ f1(g). Since g ∈ G1 and G1 contains all networks in a
closed cycle by Theorem 3, it follows that g′ ∈ G1, a contradiction to g′ ∈ G \ G1.
Consequently, it holds that g′ /∈ f1(g).
Since the allocation rule is generic, we find that g ∈ f1(g′). We have that
g ∈ f1(g′) \ {g′}, so for K = 2 the deviation from g to g′ is deterred by g. For
K ≥ 3, we have by Lemma 1 that g ∈ f1(g′) ∩ G1 ⊆ fK−2(g′) ∩ G1, so again the
deviation from g to g′ is deterred by g.
We show next that the set G1 satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3. Since G1 is
level-1 farsightedly stable, it holds for every g′ ∈ G \ G1 that f∞1 (g′) ∩ G1 6= ∅. By
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Figure 2: Networks outside closed cycles can be farsightedly stable in Example 4.
Lemma 2 it holds that f∞1 (g
′) ⊆ f∞K (g′), so f∞K (g′) ∩G1 6= ∅, and it follows that G1
satisfies Condition (ii).
Either the set G1 is a minimal set satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 3
and is therefore level-K farsightedly stable, or it has a proper subset GK which is a
minimal set satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii), so GK is level-K farsightedly stable.
In both cases, the statement of the theorem holds.
Theorem 3 asserts that there is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1, given
by the union of all closed cycles. Theorem 7 shows that higher levels of farsightedness
lead to a refinement of the networks that belong to closed cycles. For any value of
K, there is always a subset of G1 that is level-K farsightedly stable. Theorem 7
shows that an analysis based on myopic behavior may not rule out some networks
that are not stable when players are sufficiently farsighted. At the same time, a
myopic analysis is compatible with farsightedness, and for any value of K there is
always a farsightedly stable set that consists exclusively of networks that belong to
closed cycles.
Theorem 7 does not claim that farsightedly stable sets are always subsets of
networks in G1. The following example shows that networks that are not part of
any closed cycle may become stable for higher values of K.
Example 4. Consider the situation where three players can form and sever links
and where the payoffs are given as in Figure 2. The farsighted improving paths of
various lengths are presented in Table 1.
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g f˜1(g) f˜2(g) f˜3(g) f˜K(g), K ≥ 4
g0 g3 g3 g1, g3 g1, g3, g4
g1 g0 g0 g0 g0
g2 g0, g4, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g6
g3 g1 g1, g4 g1, g4
g4 g1 g0, g1 g0, g1, g3 g0, g1, g3
g5 g1, g3 g1, g3, g4, g6 g1, g3, g4, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g6
g6 g3 g3, g4 g1, g3, g4 g1, g3, g4
g7 g4, g5, g6 g1, g3, g4, g5, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g5, g6 g0, g1, g3, g4, g5, g6
Table 1: The elements of f˜K(g) in Example 4.
In this example there is a unique pairwise stable network, g3. By inspecting f˜1 as
presented in Table 1, it is easily verified that there are no other closed cycles in this
example, so G1 = {g3}. By Theorem 7, and the fact that each farsightedly stable
set contains at least one element, it holds that {g3} is a level-K farsightedly stable
set for any value of K. At the same time, the payoffs resulting from the network g3
are Pareto dominated by those of g1. The problem with network g1 is that Player 1
has myopic incentives to cut his link with Player 2 to obtain a payoff of 5 from the
network g0 instead of 4 from the network g1. Once at g0, Players 2 and 3 have myopic
incentives to form a link and form the pairwise stable network g3. The question is
whether the Pareto efficient network g1 is stable when the players are less myopic.
We first show that {g1} is a level-2 farsightedly stable set by verifying that {g1}
satisfies the three conditions in Theorem 4. There are three possible deviations from
g1. Players 1 and 2 can cut their link and move to g0, Players 1 and 3 can form a
link to arrive at g4, and Players 2 and 3 can form a link to go to g5. From Table 1 it
follows immediately that g3 ∈ f˜1(g0), g1 ∈ f˜1(g4), and g1 ∈ f˜1(g5). Since Players 1
and 2 both have lower payoffs at g3 than at g1, the first deviation is deterred. The
other two deviations are deterred by the possible return to g1. We conclude that
Condition (i) of Theorem 4 holds.
One degree of farsightedness is needed to move from g4 or g5 to g1, and two
such degrees are needed to move from g2, g3, or g7 to g1. Since g0 →1 g3 →2 g1
and g6 →1 g3 →2 g1, we have shown that for every g′ ∈ G \ {g1}, g1 ∈ f∞2 (g′), so
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Condition (ii) of Theorem 4 holds. Condition (iii) of Theorem 4 is trivially satisfied
by {g1}. 
We conclude this section by observing that farsightedly stable sets may depend
in a non-monotonic way on the degree of farsightedness by showing that {g1} is not
a level-3 farsightedly stable set in Example 4, but is a level-K farsightedly stable
set for every K ≥ n′ + 1.
Example 5. Consider the same network situation as in Example 4, so {g1} is a
level-2 farsightedly stable set. We argue by contradiction that it is not a level-3
farsightedly stable set.
Suppose that {g1} is a level-3 farsightedly stable set. Consider a deviation by
Player 1, who cuts the link with Player 2 to arrive at the network g0. When Player 1
has only two degrees of farsightedness, he might fear a further move to g3, which
would deter the deviation. With three degrees of farsightedness, Player 1 realizes
that the threat of ending in g3 is not credible, since g3 does not belong to the level-
3 farsightedly stable set {g1}. Since the set f2(g0) \ f1(g0) = ∅, the deviation by
Player 1 to g0 is not deterred according to Definition 3.
However, when players are sufficiently farsighted, {g1} reemerges as a level-K
farsightedly stable set. We consider some K ≥ n′ + 1 and verify that {g1} satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 5. As before, the only deviations from g1 are to g0, g4,
and g5. Since fn′−1(g0), fn′−1(g4), and fn′−1(g5) all contain g1, such deviations are
deterred, and Condition (i) of Theorem 3 is satisfied. Since g1 ∈ fn′−1(g′) ⊆ f∞n′−1(g′)
for all g′ ∈ G \ {g1}, we know that Condition (ii) of Theorem 3 is satisfied by {g1}.
Condition (iii) of Theorem 4 is trivially satisfied. It follows that {g1} is a level-K
farsightedly stable set for every K ≥ n′ + 1. 
6 Sufficient Conditions for Level-K Farsighted Sta-
bility
In this section, we present two sets of sufficient conditions for a set to be level-K
farsightedly stable. In many examples, these conditions are easy to verify.
A refinement of pairwise stability is obtained when we require the network g to
defeat every other adjacent network, so g ∈ f1(g′) for every network g′ adjacent to
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g. We call such a network g pairwise dominant. The following definition generalizes
this idea and allows for farsighted improving paths of any length K.
Definition 4. For K ≥ 1, a network g is level-K pairwise dominant if for every
g′ adjacent to g it holds that g ∈ fK(g′). The set of level-K pairwise dominant
networks is denoted by DK.
It follows immediately from the definition that D1 ⊆ P1. For generic allocation
rules, the concepts of pairwise stability and pairwise dominance coincide, D1 = P1.
This coincidence does not hold for values of K greater than or equal to 2. By
Lemma 1 it follows that DK ⊆ DK+1, whereas PK ⊇ PK+1.
The first set of sufficient conditions applies to the case where K = 1.
Theorem 8. If g ∈ P1 and for every g′ ∈ G\{g} it holds that g ∈ f∞1 (g′), then {g}
is the unique level-1 farsightedly stable set.
Proof. We show that {g} is a level-1 farsightedly stable set by applying Theorem 2.
The uniqueness then follows from Theorem 3. Since g ∈ P1 it holds that f1(g) = {g},
so for a deviation from g to g′ = g + ij it holds that (Yi(g′), Yj(g′)) = (Yi(g), Yj(g))
or Yi(g
′) < Yi(g) or Yj(g′) < Yj(g) and for a deviation from g to g′ = g − ij it holds
that Yi(g
′) ≤ Yi(g) and Yj(g′) ≤ Yj(g), so Condition (i) of Theorem 2 is satisfied.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2 are trivially satisfied.
The next result applies when K ≥ 2.
Theorem 9. Consider some K ≥ 2. If g ∈ DJ for some J < K and for every
g′ ∈ G \ {g} it holds that g ∈ f∞K (g′), then {g} is a level-K farsightedly stable set.
If, moreover, g ∈ PK, then {g} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set.
Proof. We start by showing that {g} is a level-K farsightedly stable set.
We first consider K = 2 and apply Theorem 4. If K = 2, then the only possibility
is that J = 1, so g ∈ D1, or equivalently g ∈ f˜1(g¯) for every g¯ adjacent to g.
Condition (i) of Theorem 4 is satisfied since a deviation from g to g¯ is deterred by
the return to g ∈ f˜1(g¯). Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 4 are trivially satisfied.
We next consider K ≥ 3 and apply Definition 3. Since g ∈ DJ for some J < K,
it holds that g ∈ fJ(g¯) ⊆ fK−1(g¯) for every g¯ adjacent to g, where the inclusion uses
Lemma 1. It holds that either g ∈ fK−2(g¯), so g ∈ fK−2(g¯) ∩ {g}, or g /∈ fK−2(g¯),
so g ∈ fK−1(g¯) \ fK−2(g¯). Condition (i) of Definition 3 is satisfied since a deviation
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from g to g¯ is deterred by the return to g ∈ [fK−2(g¯) ∩ {g}] ∪ [fK−1(g¯) \ fK−2(g¯)].
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of Definition 3 are trivially satisfied.
We complete the proof by showing that {g} is the unique level-K farsightedly
stable set if in addition g ∈ PK . Since g ∈ f∞K (g′) for every g′ ∈ G \ {g} and
g ∈ PK , we have that PK = {g}, and therefore PK is a level-K farsightedly stable
set. Corollary 1 yields the desired result.
The conditions of Theorems 8 and 9 are usually easy to verify. To show that
g ∈ P1 requires that f1(g) does not contain networks different from g. To show that
g ∈ f∞1 (g′) for all g′ 6= g, we have to find a sequence of farsighted improving paths
of length one that connect g′ to g. In Theorem 9 the requirement of Theorem 8
that g belongs to P1 is replaced by the requirement that g ∈ DJ for some J < K,
so we have to show that g ∈ fJ(g′) for all g′ adjacent to g. The higher J , the
weaker is this requirement, so we could replace the requirement g ∈ DJ for some
J < K by g ∈ DK−1. To show that g ∈ f∞K (g′) for all g′ 6= g, we have to find
a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length at most K that connect g′ to
g. Very often the analysis of farsighted improving paths of small lengths is already
sufficient. The higher K, the easier it is to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 9 and
to find a singleton level-K farsightedly stable set. Finally, to show that g ∈ PK
requires that fK(g) does not contain networks different from g. This requirement is
more difficult to satisfy for increasing values of K.
We show next how Theorems 8 and 9 can be used to analyze the stability of g3
in Example 4. In Example 4 it holds that g3 ∈ P1 and for every g ∈ G \ {g3},
g3 ∈ f∞1 (g). We can then apply Theorem 8 to conclude that {g3} is the unique
level-1 farsightedly stable set.
In Example 4 it also holds that g3 ∈ D1. Since for every g ∈ G\{g3}, g3 ∈ f∞1 (g),
we have by Lemma 2 that g3 ∈ f∞K (g) for everyK ≥ 2. We can then apply Theorem 9
to conclude that {g3} is a level-K farsightedly stable set for any value of K ≥ 2.
We have illustrated in Example 4 that there are other farsightedly stable sets for
higher values of K, in particular {g1} can be sustained as a farsightedly stable set
for higher values of K. Indeed, for K ≥ 2, fK(g3) contains networks different from
g3, so the condition g3 ∈ PK in Theorem 9, which is sufficient for uniqueness of {g3}
as a level-K farsightedly stable set, does not hold.
In Example 4, {g1} has been shown to be a level-2 farsightedly stable set. In
Example 5 we have argued that g1 is not a level-3 farsightedly stable set. We show
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next that Theorem 9 can be used to show that {g1} is a level-K farsightedly stable
set for any K ≥ 4. The adjacent networks of g1 are g0, g4, and g5. It follows from
Table 1 that f3(g
0), f3(g
4), and f3(g
5) all contain g1, so g1 ∈ D3. We have already
argued in Example 4 that for every g′ ∈ G \ {g1} it holds that g1 ∈ f∞2 (g′) so, by
Lemma 2, we have that g1 ∈ f∞K (g′) for all K ≥ 2. Combining the conclusions in
the previous two sentences and applying Theorem 9 proves that {g1} is a level-K
farsightedly stable set for any K ≥ 4.
7 Efficiency and Stability
We now turn to the question of how level-K farsighted stability is related to the
efficiency of networks. A network g is strongly efficient if
∑
i∈N Yi(g) >
∑
i∈N Yi(g
′)
for all g′ 6= g. Assume that there is a network g˜ that strictly Pareto dominates all
other networks. That is, Yi(g˜) > Yi(g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G \ {g˜}. Hence,
g˜ is both Pareto efficient and strongly efficient.
Theorem 10. Assume that the network g˜ strictly Pareto dominates all networks
g ∈ G \ {g˜}. Then, {g˜} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥
n(n− 1)/2.
Proof. First, we show that g˜ ∈ D1. For all g ∈ G \ {g˜} , it holds that Yi(g˜) > Yi(g)
for all i ∈ N, so we have that g˜ ∈ f1(g) for any network g adjacent to g˜, so g˜ ∈ D1.
Moreover, for every g ∈ G \ {g˜}, we have that g˜ ∈ fK(g) when K ≥ n(n − 1)/2.
Indeed, all players like to move from g to g˜ given that Yi(g˜) > Yi(g) for all i ∈ N ,
and the maximum number of links that one needs to cut or form from g in order
to reach g˜ is equal to the number of links in the complete network, n(n − 1)/2. It
follows that g˜ ∈ f∞K (g) for all g ∈ G \ {g˜}. Finally, since g˜ strictly Pareto dominates
all other networks, we have that fK(g˜) = {g˜} for all K ≥ 1. Thus, g˜ ∈ PK for all
K ≥ 1, and by Theorem 9 we have that {g˜} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable
set for all K ≥ n(n− 1)/2.
In the investment game of Example 1, the complete network gN strictly Pareto
dominates all other networks. Hence, from Theorem 10 we have that {gN} is the
unique level-K farsightedly stable set for all K ≥ n(n−1)/2. Observe that Theorem
10 holds for levels of farsightedness relatively small as compared to the total number
of possible networks.
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There are many situations where a Pareto dominating network does not exist. We
therefore turn our attention to allocation rules satisfying increasing returns to link
creation. An allocation rule Y displays no externalities across components (NEC)
if for every g ∈ G, for every h ∈ C(g), we have Yi(g) = Yi(h) for all i ∈ N(h) and
Yi(g) = 0 for all i ∈ N \N(g). In particular, it holds that Yi(g∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
If an allocation rule satisfies NEC, then it is sufficient to specify the allocation rule
for connected networks. The set of connected networks is denoted by C.
Consider some allocation rule Y and let
C+(Y ) = {h ∈ C \ {g∅} |∑i∈NYi(h) ≥ 0}
be the set of non-empty connected networks with non-negative aggregate payoffs.
The allocation rule Y satisfies increasing returns to link creation (IRL)14 if:
(i) Y satisfies NEC.
(ii) If h ∈ C+(Y ) and h ⊆ h′ ∈ C, then h′ ∈ C+(Y ).
(iii) If h ∈ C+(Y ) and ij ∈ h, then Yi(h− ij) ≤ Yi(h) and Yj(h− ij) ≤ Yj(h) with
at least one inequality holding strictly.
(iv) There exists h′ ∈ C+(Y ) such that for all h ∈ C with h  h′, for all i ∈ N(h′),
we have Yi(h) < Yi(h
′).
If an allocation rule satisfies increasing returns to link creation, then by Con-
dition (iv) there is a non-empty connected network h′ for which the payoff of all
players having at least one link is greater than the payoffs they could obtain in any
network h  h′. If we take h = g∅, then it follows that Yi(h′) > 0 for all i ∈ N(h′).
By Condition (ii), the aggregate payoffs in any connected network containing h′ are
non-negative, and it follows in particular that
∑
i∈N Yi(g
N) ≥ 0.15 Notice that in
14Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2005) defines the property of increasing returns to link creation for a
value function. A value function satisfies this property if there is a threshold network for which the
value is non-negative, and each time a new link is added to this threshold network, both aggregate
payoffs and payoffs of players who are adding a link to the network increase. Here, we translate
the main idea behind this property to an allocation rule.
15Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2005) defines the property of increasing returns to link creation for a
value function by imposing the value of each network h ) h′ to be greater than the value of h′ and,
in particular, that the complete network generates the highest possible value, i.e. the complete
network is the strongly efficient network.
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connected networks containing h′, some players may have negative payoffs, but that
their payoffs increase when making additional links by Condition (iii). The invest-
ment game in Example 1 satisfies IRL as well as generalizations of the investment
game where payoffs to players are positive as soon as the network has more links
than some threshold value. Another model that satisfies IRL is the symmetric con-
nections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) when the cost for maintaining a link
is small, c < δ(1− δ).
We now show that if the allocation rule satisfies IRL, then there exists a value of
K ′ such that, for all K ≥ K ′, {gN} is a level-K farsightedly stable set. A minimal
network h′ as in Condition (iv) of IRL is called critical. Let K˜ = min{#h′ | h′ is
a critical network} be the number of links in the critical network with the lowest
number of links, and letK be the highest number of links in a connected network that
does not contain any critical network. Then K ′ can be taken equal to max{K˜,K}.
For the investment game in Example 1 it holds that K˜ = n(n − 1)/2 and K =
n(n− 1)/2− 1, so K ′ = n(n− 1)/2.
Theorem 11. Let the allocation rule Y satisfy IRL. Then
{
gN
}
is a level-K far-
sightedly stable set for all K ≥ max{K˜,K}.
Proof. First, we show that gN ∈ D1. We argued before that IRL implies gN ∈
C+(Y ). By Condition (iii) of IRL, we have that Yi(g
N) ≥ Yi(gN − ij) and Yj(gN) ≥
Yj(g
N − ij) with at least one inequality holding strictly. It follows that gN ∈ f1(g)
for any network g adjacent to gN , so gN ∈ D1.
To apply Theorem 9, or Theorem 8 when K = 1, we need to show that gN ∈
f∞K (g) for every g 6= gN .
(a) First, consider any network g′ ∈ G having a component h′ ∈ C(g′) such
that
∑
i∈N Yi(h
′) < 0. By Condition (ii) of IRL it follows for any non-empty and
connected h ⊆ h′ that ∑i∈N Yi(h) < 0, so h′ does not contain a critical network.
Moreover, for any non-empty h ⊆ h′ there is a player i ∈ N(h) who has a payoff
Yi(h) < 0, and so i has incentives to cut a link, say link ij, foreseeing the empty
network where Yi(g
∅) = 0. We have that g∅ ∈ fK(h′), and therefore that g′ \ h′ ∈
fK(g
′).
If g′ \h′ has a component h′′ ∈ C(g′ \h′) such that ∑i∈N Yi(h′′) < 0, then we can
use the argument of the previous paragraph to obtain that g′ \(h′∪h′′) ∈ fK(g′ \h′),
and therefore that g′ \ (h′ ∪ h′′) ∈ f 2
K
(g′). Repeating this argument a finite number
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of times, we arrive at a network g that is either equal to g∅ or has only components
belonging to C+(Y ).
(b) Second, consider the empty network g∅. From Condition (iv) of IRL, there is
a network h′ ∈ C+(Y ) such that for all h ∈ C with h ( h′ it holds that Yi(h′) > Yi(h)
for all i ∈ N(h′). In particular, we have that Yi(h′) > Yi(g∅) for all i ∈ N(h′). Let
h′ be such a network with K˜ links. The players in N(h′) have incentives to form
sequentially the missing links in g∅ foreseeing h′, so h′ ∈ fK˜(g∅).
(c) Third, consider any non-empty network g′ 6= gN having only components in
C+(Y ) and let i be a player in N(g′) with degree di(g′) < n− 1. Let j ∈ N be such
that ij /∈ g′. It follows from Conditions (i) and (ii) of IRL that all components of
g′+ ij belong to C+(Y ). We find by Conditions (i) and (iii) of IRL that Yi(g′+ ij) ≥
Yi(g
′) and Yj(g′ + ij) ≥ Yj(g′) with at least one inequality strict, so g′ + ij ∈ f1(g′).
Repeating this argument m times, where m is the number of links in gN \g′, we find
that gN ∈ fm1 (g′).
Theorem 9 now implies that
{
gN
}
is a level-K farsightedly stable set for all
K ≥ max{K˜,K}.
In the symmetric connections model, there is a sequence of improving paths of
length 1 from any g 6= gN to gN when c < δ(1 − δ). Hence, if c < δ(1 − δ), then
gN ∈ f∞1 (g) for any g 6= gN , and {gN} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set
for all K ≥ 1. In this model, the complete network is strongly efficient.
8 Criminal Networks
There is empirical evidence suggesting that peer effects and the structure of social
interactions matter strongly in explaining an individual’s own criminal or delinquent
behavior.16 Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) provide a network analysis of criminal
behavior. They develop a model where criminals compete with each other in criminal
activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by improving their
knowledge of the crime business. Individuals decide first whether to work or to
become a criminal and then they choose the crime effort to exert if criminals.17
16See Patacchini and Zenou (2008) among others.
17Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) mostly focus on the case where the network is exogenously
given. They show that multiple equilibria with different members of active criminals and levels of
involvement in crime business may coexist.
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Here, we present a simplified version of their model, which puts emphasis on the
formation of links and keeps the level of criminal activities of the players fixed.
Throughout this section, we assume n ≥ 3. The players are referred to as crim-
inals. Given some criminal network g, the elements of P (g) are called criminal
groups. Each criminal group S has a positive probability pS(g) of winning the loot
B > 0. It is assumed that the bigger the criminal group, the higher its probability
of getting the loot. This assumption captures the idea that delinquents learn from
other criminals belonging to the same group how to commit crime in a more efficient
way by sharing the know-how about the technology of crime. We assume that the
probability of winning the loot is given by pS(g) = #S/n.
The network architecture determines how the loot is shared among the criminals
in the group. Consider some Player i ∈ N and let S ∈ P (g) be the criminal group i
belongs to. We define ci(g) = maxj∈S dj(g) as the maximum degree in this criminal
group. A criminal i who is part of a group S ∈ P (g) expects a share αi(g) of the
loot given by
αi(g) =
{
1
#{j∈S|dj(g)=cj(g)} , if di(g) = ci(g),
0, otherwise.
That is, within each criminal group, the criminal that has the highest number of
links gets the loot. If two or more criminals have the highest number of links, then
they share the loot equally among them.
Criminal i has a probability qi(g) of being caught, in which case his rewards
are punished at a rate φ > 0. It is assumed that the higher the number of links a
criminal has, the lower his individual probability of being caught. We assume that
the probability of being caught is simply given by
qi(g) =
n− 1− di(g)
n
.
The total payoffs of criminal i belonging to criminal group S ∈ P (g) are therefore
equal to
Yi(g) = pS(g)αi(g)(1− qi(g)φ)B
=
{
#S
n
1
#{j∈S|dj(g)=ci(g)}(1−
n−1−di(g)
n
φ)B, if di(g) = ci(g),
0, otherwise.
We require φ < n/(n − 1) to guarantee that payoffs are non-negative and positive
for a player with the highest degree in his group.
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Figure 3: The 3-player criminal networks.
Figure 3 presents the payoffs for 3-player criminal networks with B = 9 and
φ = 1. Table 2 shows the farsighted improving paths for the different possible
values of K. It can be verified that the farsighted improving paths for the 3-player
case do not depend on the specific choices for B and φ.
g f˜1(g) f˜2(g) f˜K(g), K ≥ 3
g0 g1, g2, g3 g1, g2, g3 g1, g2, g3, g7
g1, g2, g3 g7 g7
g4 g1, g2, g7 g1, g2, g7 g1, g2, g3, g7
g5 g1, g3, g7 g1, g3, g7 g1, g2, g3, g7
g6 g2, g3, g7 g2, g3, g7 g1, g2, g3, g7
g7
Table 2: The elements of f˜K(g) for 3-player criminal networks with B = 9 and
φ = 1.
For the three-player case, we compute the closed cycles and use Theorem 3 to
conclude that G1 = P1 = {g1, g2, g3, g7} is the level-1 farsightedly stable set, so G1
consists of all pairwise stable networks. There are many networks that are stable
when players are myopic.
For K ≥ 2, we apply Theorem 9 to show that GK = {g7} is the unique level-
K farsightedly stable set. It holds that g7 ∈ D1 and g7 ∈ f∞2 (g) for every g 6=
g7, so {g7} is a level-K farsightedly stable set. Since g7 ∈ PK , it follows from
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Theorem 9 that {g7} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set. If criminals
behave myopically, they may not go beyond forming a single link in the three player
case. But with a degree of farsightedness of at least 2, the complete criminal network
emerges as the unique prediction.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the analysis of criminal networks
with a general number n of players. As in the 3-criminal case, there are many
networks that are pairwise stable in the n-person case. The complete network is
easily verified to be pairwise stable. The generalization of the networks g1, g2, and
g3 for the 3-criminal case to the n-criminal case would be any network consisting
of complete components, where no two components have the same degree. But also
any network with a single component where all players have a degree at least equal
to two and one player has a degree that is at least two times higher than the degree
of any other player is pairwise stable.
We will argue next that {gN} is a level-K farsightedly stable set whenever K ≥
n− 1.
We show first that the complete network is pairwise dominant.
Lemma 3. For criminal networks it holds that gN ∈ D1.
Proof. Consider the network gN − ij for some ij. It holds that
di(g
N − ij) = dj(gN − ij) < ci(gN − ij) = cj(gN − ij),
so
Yi(g
N − ij) = Yj(gN − ij) = 0 < Yi(gN) = Yj(gN),
and gN ∈ f1(gN − ij). We have shown that gN ∈ D1.
We show next that the complete network can be reached from any starting
network by repeated application of at most n− 1 degrees of farsightedness.
Lemma 4. For criminal networks, it holds for every g ∈ G\{gN} that gN ∈ f∞n−1(g).
Proof.
Step 1. If g has a component which is not complete, then there is g′ ∈ fn−1(g)
such that g ( g′.
Let S ∈ P (g) be a criminal group such that some internal links are missing, g|S 6= gS.
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If for every i ∈ S it holds that di(g) = ci(g), so all players in S have the same
degree, then any two players i and j in S create a link to form the network g + ij
and improve their payoffs since the increase in their degree increases the share in the
loot and lowers the probability of being caught for both players, αi(g + ij) > αi(g),
αj(g + ij) > αj(g), qi(g + ij) < qi(g), and qj(g + ij) < qj(g), so Yi(g + ij) > Yi(g)
and Yj(g + ij) > Yj(g). We have that g →1 g + ij, so clearly g + ij ∈ fn−1(g).
If the players in S do not all have the same degree, let i ∈ S be a player with
di(g) < ci(g), so αi(g) = 0 and therefore Yi(g) = 0.
If ci(g) = #S−1, then Player i consecutively links to all players j ∈ S such that
ij /∈ g, thereby forming a network g′ where he has degree #S − 1. The payoffs of
Player i are in every step equal to Yi(g) = 0 until the final step, where his payoffs
increase to Yi(g
′) > 0. Every player j that i links to has degree below #S − 1 and
therefore payoffs equal to 0 ≤ Yj(g′). We have that g′ ∈ f#S−2(g) ⊆ fn−1(g).
If ci(g) < #S − 1, then let j ∈ S be a player with dj(g) = ci(g). Player i
(with di(g) < ci(g)) links with Player j to form the network g + ij. It holds that
Yi(g + ij) = Yi(g) = 0 and Yj(g + ij) > Yj(g) > 0, since αj(g + ij) ≥ αj(g) and
qj(g+ ij) < qj(g). In this case we have that g →1 g+ ij, so clearly g+ ij ∈ fn−1(g).
Step 2. If all components of g are complete and g 6= gN , then there is g′ ∈ fn−1(g)
such that g ( g′.
The assumptions of Step 2 imply that g consists of at least two criminal groups. Let
S1 and S2 be two criminal groups in P (g).
If #S1 = #S2, then form a link between a Player i ∈ S1 and a Player j ∈ S2.
Since qi(g) > qi(g + ij), we have that
Yi(g) =
1
n
(1− qi(g)φ)B < #S1n (1− qi(g + ij)φ)B = Yi(g + ij).
By the same calculation, it follows that Yj(g) < Yj(g + ij), so g →1 g + ij, and
therefore g + ij ∈ fn−1(g).
Otherwise, it holds without loss of generality that #S1 < #S2. Select some
player i ∈ S1 and a set J consisting of #S2 + 1−#S1 players in S2, who link con-
secutively to Player i to form network g′. The resulting finite sequence of networks
is denoted g0, . . . , gK with g0 = g and gK = g
′. Notice that K ≤ n − 1. We show
next that for every k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, (Yi(gk), Yjk(gk)) < (Yi(gK), Yjk(gK)), where
jk ∈ J is such that gk+1 = gk + ijk, thereby proving that (g0, . . . , gK) is a farsighted
improving path and completing the proof of Step 2.
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For every player j ∈ J we have
dj(gK) = di(gK) = ci(gK),
and for all other players the degree is strictly less than ci(gK), so
Yj(gK) = Yi(gK) =
#S1 + #S2
n
1
#S2 + 2−#S1 (1− qi(gK)φ)B.
For k = 0, we have
Yi(g0) =
1
n
(1− qi(g)φ)B < Yi(gK),
Yj0(g0) =
1
n
(1− qj0(g)φ)B < Yj0(gK),
where we use qi(g0) > qi(gK) and qj0(g0) > qj0(gK) to get the strict inequalities.
For k = 1, . . . , K−1, it holds that Player i is connected to Player j0, so di(gk) <
dj0(gk) = ci(gk), so αi(gk) = 0 and 0 = Yi(gk) < Yi(gK). Similarly, it holds that
Player jk is connected to Player j0, so djk(gk) < dj0(gk) = cjk(gk), so αjk(gk) = 0
and 0 = Yjk(gk) < Yjk(gK).
Step 3. For every g ∈ G \ {gN}, it holds that gN ∈ f∞n−1(g).
By combining the results of Step 1 and Step 2, we have that for every g ∈ G \ {gN},
there is g′ ∈ fn−1(g) with strictly more links than g. Since the complete network gN
has n(n− 1)/2 links, we find that gN ∈ fn(n−1)/2n−1 (g) ⊆ f∞n−1(g).
Using Theorem 9 we prove now that the complete network {gN} is a level-K
farsightedly stable set for every K ≥ n− 1.18 Notice that the level of farsightedness
needed to sustain the complete network {gN} is quite small when compared to the
number of potential networks and the maximum length of paths.
Theorem 12. For criminal networks it holds that {gN} is a level-K farsightedly
stable set for every K ≥ n− 1.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that gN ∈ D1. By Lemma 4 we have that for every
g′ ∈ G\{gN} it holds that gN ∈ f∞n−1(g′) ⊆ f∞K (g′), where the inclusion follows from
Lemma 2. We are now in a position to apply Theorem 9 and conclude that {gN} is
a level-K farsightedly stable set.
18Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) show that in the example of criminal networks
with n players, the complete network {gN} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
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How about the uniqueness of {gN} as a level-K farsightedly stable set? It is
tempting to use the approach of Theorem 9 and show such a result by proving that
gN ∈ PK . However, consider the case with 6 players and let g′ = gN−16−26−35−45.
For any value of B and φ,19 we claim that g′ ∈ f12(gN), so gN /∈ P12. Since the
network g′ is connected, d1(g′) = d2(g′) = d3(g′) = d4(g′) = 4, and d5(g′) = d6(g′) =
3, it holds for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} that Yi(g′) = (1/4 − φ/24)B > B/6 = Yi(gN)
and for any j ∈ {5, 6} that Yj(g′) = 0 < B/6 = Yj(gN). The construction of the
farsighted improving path is, however, more subtle than simply deleting the links
16, 26, 35, and 45 in some order. Indeed, after the deletion of three such links, there
are exactly two players with the maximum degree and they would get strictly lower
payoffs by cutting their link, and would be unwilling to do so. The way to avoid
this problem requires more farsightedness and involves all players in {1, 2, 3, 4} first
cutting two of their mutual links, before severing the links with players 5 and 6, and
finally restoring their mutual links. One explicit farsighted improving path results
from gN − 12− 23− 34− 41− 16− 26− 35− 45 + 12 + 23 + 34 + 41 and takes 12
steps. We have denoted the player with an incentive to cut a link first, so −16 for
instance means that Player 1 cuts his link with Player 6, whereas −61 would mean
that Player 6 cuts his link with Player 1. It can be verified that each step in this
farsighted improving path is feasible indeed.
We conclude this section by showing that if players are not too farsighted, then
gN ∈ PK , so {gN} is the unique level-K farsightedly stable set. More precisely, we
will from now on consider K = n− 1. We show first that any network in fn−1(gN)
has a single component involving all players.
Lemma 5. For criminal networks it holds for every g′ ∈ fn−1(gN) that P (g′) = {N}.
Proof. Consider the criminal group S of Player 1 in g′. We show that it contains all
players. Suppose it contains only s ≤ n− 1 players. Then, starting from gN , those
s players have to cut all their links with all other players in N \ S. This involves
at least s(n − s) steps. For fixed n, the concavity of s(n − s) in s implies that it
is minimized at s = 1 or s = n − 1. Substitution of these values of s shows the
minimum to be equal to n− 1 at both s = 1 and s = n− 1. When the s players cut
all their links with all other players in N \ S, all the players in N are strictly worse
off, since the probability of being caught has strictly increased and the probability
19We maintain the assumption that φ < n/(n− 1).
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of winning the loot has decreased, contradicting g′ ∈ fn−1(gN).
We show next that the complete network gN is level-(n− 1) pairwise stable.
Lemma 6. For criminal networks it holds that gN ∈ Pn−1.
Proof. Suppose g′ is an element of f˜n−1(gN). Let g0, . . . , gK with g0 = gN and
gK = g
′ be a farsighted improving path of length K ≤ n− 1. By Lemma 5 it holds
that ci(g
′) is independent from i, so we denote it by c. Let M ⊆ N be such that
i ∈ M if and only if di(g′) = c and denote the cardinality of M by m. It cannot
be that m = n, since then all players have lower payoffs in g′ than in gN because
the probability of being caught is higher in g′ than in gN . Since g′ is connected by
Lemma 5, it follows that Yj(g
′) = 0 for all j ∈ N \M . A player j ∈ N \M will
therefore not sever a link at any network in the farsighted improving path g0, . . . , gK .
It follows that∑
i∈M
(n− 1− di(g′)) ≥
∑
j∈N\M
(n− 1− dj(g′)).
Since di(g
′) > dj(g′) whenever i ∈M and j ∈ N \M , we have that m > n/2.
Since at least one link ij with i ∈ M and j ∈ N is missing in g′, it follows that
the maximum degree in g′ satisfies c ≤ n− 2.
The number K is equal to the number of times a link ij is severed with i ∈ M
and j ∈ N \M plus the number of times a link ij is cut with i, j ∈ M plus the
number of link additions. We argue next that lower bounds for these three numbers
are given by 2(n−m), 2m− n− 1, and 1, respectively.
Since all players in N \M experienced the severance of at least two links, and
any such link is cut by a player in M , a lower bound for the first number is 2(n−m).
For k = 0, . . . , K, let L(gk) = {i ∈ N | di(gk) = n − 1} be the set of players
with degree n − 1 and let `(gk) = #L(gk) be its cardinality. Clearly, it holds that
`(gN) = n and `(g′) = 0. Let k′ be the lowest value of k such that `(gk) ≤ m for
all k ≥ k′. Since `(gk) − `(gk+1) ≤ 2, we find that `(gk′) = m or `(gk′) = m − 1.
The sum of the cardinality `(gk′) of L(gk′) and the cardinality m of M is therefore
at least 2m − 1. Since there are only n players, it follows that #(L(gk′) ∩M), the
cardinality of the set of players in L(gk′) that belong to M , is at least 2m− n− 1.
For all k ≥ k′, for all i ∈ L(gk), it holds that Yi(gk) > Yi(g′), since the loot
has to be shared with less or the same number of criminals and the probability of
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being caught is strictly less when comparing gk to g
′. Such a player i will therefore
never choose to sever a link himself, so whenever a link involving player i ∈ L(gk) is
severed when going from gk to gk+1, it must be by a player in M \ L(gk). It follows
that `(gk) − `(gk+1) ≤ 1. Since #(L(gk′) ∩M) ≥ 2m − n − 1, we find that going
from gk′ to g
′ involves the deletion of at least 2m− n− 1 links ij with i, j ∈M .
We argue next that the move from gK−1 to gK involves a link addition. Suppose
not, then there is ij with i ∈ M such that gK = gK−1 − ij and Yi(gK) > Yi(gK−1).
Since di(gK−1) = ci(gK−1) > ci(gK) = di(gK), it follows that at gK , i has to share
the loot with more criminals and has a higher probability of being caught than at
gK−1, so Yi(gK) < Yi(gK−1), leading to a contradiction. Consequently, the move
from gK−1 to gK involves a link addition.
We have proved that K ≥ 2(n−m) + 2m−n− 1 + 1 = n, which contradicts our
original supposition that K ≤ n− 1. Consequently, it holds that f˜n−1(gN) = ∅.
Using Theorem 9 we prove now that the complete network {gN} is the unique
level-(n− 1) farsightedly stable set.
Theorem 13. For criminal networks it holds that {gN} is the unique level-(n− 1)
farsightedly stable set.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that gN ∈ D1. By Lemma 4 we have that for every
g′ ∈ G \ {gN} it holds that gN ∈ f∞n−1(g′). By Lemma 6 it holds that gN ∈ Pn−1.
We are now in a position to apply Theorem 9 and conclude that {gN} is the unique
level-(n− 1) farsightedly stable set.
Structural properties of criminal networks must be taken into account to better
understand the impact of peer influence on delinquent behavior and to address
adequate and novel delinquency-reducing policies. Hence, it is important to acquire
knowledge about the level of farsightedness of criminals to determine which criminal
networks are likely to emerge in the long run.20
20Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2010) develop a criminal network game where each
delinquent decides how much delinquency effort to exert. The network is determined endogenously
by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing criminal activities. They find
that the optimal enforcement policy consists of removing some key player or some key group. Such
a policy is complex since it depends both on the wage and on the network. Indeed, the removal
of some players may induce further voluntary moves of other players who now find it profitable to
leave their criminal activities and join the labor market.
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9 Conclusion
We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are limited
farsighted. Pairwise stability is a very important tool in network analysis. One
shortcoming of pairwise stability is the lack of farsightedness. Players do not antic-
ipate that other players may react to their changes. However, farsighted stability
often requires too much foresight on behalf of the players. Hence we propose an
intermediate concept, namely level-K farsighted stability, that can be used to study
the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability.
In the present paper, we assume that all players have a reasoning horizon of
length K, where K can be any natural number. By doing so we cover myopic and full
farsighted behavior as extreme cases, and we are able to provide a tractable concept
to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on the predictions of network
formation models. Recently, Kirchsteiger, Mantovani, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2013) show experimental evidence that suggests that subjects are consistent with
intermediate levels of farsightedness.
We think that our concept of level-K farsighted stability could be useful in the
study of the level of farsightedness needed in order to sustain certain networks as sta-
ble outcomes. Consider for instance the formation of a network of bilateral free trade
agreements. Goyal and Joshi (2006) show that global free trade, represented by the
complete network, is pairwise stable, implying that global free trade, if reached, will
prevail. However, the complete network is not the unique pairwise stable network
and Goyal and Joshi’s analysis leaves out the issue whether global free trade can
be obtained from the empty network or any preexisting free trade network when
countries are myopic.
Recently, Zhang, Xue and Zu (2013) complements the analysis of Goyal and
Joshi (2006) by examining whether global free trade can result from a sequence
of bilateral free trade agreements when countries are farsighted. They show that
the complete network constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set, though is not
uniquely so. In particular, they show that there is a farsighted improving path from
the empty network to the complete network which involves link additions only, while
farsighted improving paths from preexisting free trade networks may involve both
link deletion and addition. However, in order to obtain this result, Zhang, Xue
and Zu (2013) assumes that countries have perfect foresight. Could global free trade
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result from a sequence of bilateral free trade agreements when countries are neither
myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness?
Which is the level of farsightedness needed in order to reach the global free trade
network from any preexisting free trade network? Structural properties of free trade
networks must be taken into account to better understand whether free trade areas
are conductive or detrimental to globalization. Hence, it is important to acquire
knowledge about the level of farsightedness of countries to determine which free
trade networks are likely to emerge in the long run and the kind of intervention that
supranational authorities should undertake in order to promote global free trade.
One-to-one matching problems are another simple example of network formation.
Agents are either male or female, and a man (woman) only wants to be matched
to a woman (man) or to him(her)self. For one-to-one matching problems, Ehlers
(1997) characterizes the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set using a direct
dominance relation and shows that this set can be larger than the core. Mauleon,
Vergote and Vannetelbosch (2011) provides the characterization of vNM farsightedly
stable sets (that are also pairwise farsightedly stable sets of Herings, Mauleon and
Vannetelbosch, 2009): a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only
if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable
sets, vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core.
However, to obtain this result, Mauleon, Vergote and Vannetelbosch (2011) assumes
that agents are completely farsighted. When this is the case, each core element can
be reached by means of a farsighted improving path from any other matching. How
robust is this result to the introduction of limited farsightedness? Which is the level
of farsightedness that guarantee that only core elements are stable in the long run?
Empirical work suggests that R&D collaboration between firms is common. Typ-
ically, collaboration ties are bilateral and are embedded within a broader network
of similar ties with other firms. Several recent contributions have examined the in-
centives of firms to collaborate with each other in order to reduce its marginal cost
of production (see, for instance, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) and Goyal and
Joshi (2003)). All these contributions differ in the way they model the reduction
in marginal cost due to the R&D collaborative agreement as well as the spillovers
on competitors, but they all assume that firms are myopic. Recently, Mauleon,
Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2014) studies the R&D networks that would
arise in the long run, analyzing both the case with myopic firms and the one with
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farsighted firms. The reduction of the marginal cost of production for one firm is
assumed to be proportional to the number of firms it is connected to. They show
that firms form networks consisting of two components, with firms in the largest
component obtaining a competitive advantage upon the other group. The difference
in the number of firms between the two components is at most three if firms are
myopic. However, if firms are farsighted, the largest component comprises roughly
three-quarters of the firms, hence the larger group of firms can derive a much greater
competitive advantage from R&D collaborations relative to the other group. In or-
der to give the correct incentives for firms to form collaborative agreements, it is
necessary to know the structural properties of the R&D networks that will emerge
in the long run. For this reason, and given the different predictions about the sta-
ble R&D networks when firms are either myopic or farsighted, it is crucial to know
which R&D networks firms with intermediate degrees of farsightedness would form.
Which is the level of farsightedness needed to obtain the predictions for completely
farsighted firms? How do the predictions about stable R&D networks relate to the
degree of farsightedness? We argue here that our concept could be used as a first
step in trying to answer all these questions.
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